

SECRET

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*Serials marked on pages*

*3 through 6.*

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AND THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

GENERAL CARPENTER, MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND AND  
STAFF OF THE AIR UNIVERSITY, GENTLEMEN:

AS YOU KNOW FROM YOUR SCHEDULES, MR. HELMS,  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, HAD PLANNED  
TO APPEAR AT THIS TIME AND DISCUSS THE U.S. INTELLI-  
GENCE COMMUNITY AND THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH INTELLI-  
GENCE MAKES IN THE FORMULATION OF OUR NATIONAL SE-  
CURITY POLICY. IN WORKING UP HIS REMARKS, MR.  
HELMS DECIDED TO EXAMINE THESE SUBJECTS--NOT FROM  
THE USUAL ORGANIZATIONAL POINT OF VIEW--BUT FROM  
THE VANTAGE POINT OF HIS POSITION AS DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. HE ALSO BELIEVED YOU WOULD  
BE INTERESTED IN HIS VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIPS OF  
CIA WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS AND PUBLIC, AND THE PROB-  
LEMS OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN AN OPEN,  
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

NOW WE ALL KNOW THAT CIA IS A PRETTY INTEREST-  
ING TOPIC--TO JUDGE FROM THE WAY THE NEWS MEDIA  
SEIZE ON ANY STORY CONNECTED WITH CIA. BUT THE  
POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS

EVEN MORE INTERESTING, SINCE IT INVOLVES SEVERAL IMPORTANT "HATS" OR ROLES. SO, IN PITCH-HITTING FOR THE DIRECTOR TODAY, I WILL PRESENT THE SUBJECTS FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW AS THE PRESENT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SEES THEM.

ACCORDINGLY, MY REMARKS WILL COME IN TWO MAIN PIECES. THE FIRST WILL CONSIDER THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE JOB DESCRIPTION OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, GIVING A MINIMUM OF ATTENTION TO THE TEDIOUS NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE MATTER. IN THE SECOND, I WILL TAKE UP FOUR OR FIVE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL AND EVERLASTING PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT HIM. THESE ARE THE MATTERS TO WHICH ALL DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST GIVE THEIR UNDIVIDED ATTENTION. I HOPE THAT INTRODUCING THEM AND ELABORATING THEM A BIT WILL, IF NOTHING ELSE, PROVOKE A PROFITABLE DISCUSSION IN THE QUESTION PERIOD.

IF THERE WERE SUCH A THING AS A TERSE DESCRIPTION OF THE JOB OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, IT WOULD COME IN FOUR PARAGRAPHS. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WOULD SAY THAT THE DIRECTOR IS IN CHARGE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN ALL ASPECTS OF ITS WORK. THIS MEANS THAT HE MUST LOOK INWARD AND DIRECT A WIDE RANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE ARE THE

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COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE, THROUGH OVERT MEANS AND THROUGH ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE; THE PRODUCTION OF FINISHED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES; AND THE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED BUSINESS WHICH WE CALL COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.

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TO CARRY OUT THESE MISSIONS, CIA IS ORGANIZED INTO FOUR PRINCIPAL GROUPINGS--REFERRED TO AS DIRECTORATES--AND SEVERAL STAFF OR SPECIAL FUNCTIONS THE HEADS OF WHICH REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR, SUCH AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES. I WILL RETURN LATER TO THE BOX ON THE UPPER RIGHT OF THIS CHART--NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM EVALUATION.

THE DDI, OR INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, IS THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCER OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE. THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE ALSO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, OR NPIC, AND THE AGENCY'S REFERENCE SERVICES ROUND OUT THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE.

THE NEXT DIRECTORATE IS THE DDP OR PLANS DIRECTORATE WHICH IS ANOTHER WAY OF REFERRING TO CIA'S



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CLANDESTINE SERVICES. THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES CONDUCT ESPIONAGE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS. (1)

THE DDP OR CLANDESTINE SERVICES ARE ORGANIZED IN A SERIES OF AREA DIVISIONS, SIMILAR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REGIONAL BUREAUS. IT ALSO HAS STAFFS FOR SPECIALIZED MATTERS SUCH AS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, COVERT ACTION AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. THIS DIRECTORATE OPERATES THE CLANDESTINE UNITS ABROAD WHICH WE CALL "STATIONS."

THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, CONCENTRATES ON THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING R&D FOR TECHNICAL COLLECTION OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE ON THE S&T CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NATIONS. THIS DIRECTORATE ALSO HOUSES OUR CENTRAL ELECTRONIC COMPUTER CENTER. THERE ARE A FEW S&T ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE DDS&T. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NPIC HANDLES ITS OWN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING FOR PHOTO INTERPRETATION EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, THE DDS&T CONSOLIDATES AND PASSES MUSTER ON ALL R&D PROGRAMS WITHIN THE AGENCY.

THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE IS THE SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, WHICH EMBRACES THE SUPPORT SERVICES, SUCH

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AS SECURITY, TRAINING, COMMUNICATIONS, FINANCE, PROCUREMENT, PERSONNEL, PRINTING AND OUR HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS.

OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO RUNNING CIA IS THE FACT THAT THE DIRECTOR MUST LOOK OUTWARD AND REPRESENT THE AGENCY TO THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS TO THE CONGRESS AND, INDEED, THE PUBLIC.

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE JOB DESCRIPTION WOULD NOTE THAT THE DIRECTOR IS THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS MEANS JUST WHAT IT SAYS: THE WORDS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL COVER A LOT OF GROUND AND A LOT OF VERY HIGH LEVEL OFFICERS OF GOVERNMENT. IN POPULAR LANGUAGE THIS PART OF THE JOB IS FREQUENTLY SPOKEN OF AS BEING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S SENIOR OR PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND LETTERS OF AUTHORITY HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY BOTH PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THIS EFFECT.

THE THIRD PARAGRAPH IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE SECOND AND WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT, AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS THE COORDINATOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN OPERATIONAL TERMS, THIS MEANS THAT HE PRESIDES OVER THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE

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(3)  
BOARD WHICH ASSISTS AND ADVISES HIM IN THE EXERCISE  
OF HIS COORDINATING RESPONSIBILITY.

THE MEMBERS OF THIS BOARD ARE:

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,  
WHO REPRESENTS CIA'S VIEWS IN THIS  
PARTICULAR FORUM;

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE;

THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY  
AGENCY;

THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY;

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE ATOMIC  
ENERGY COMMISSION; AND

A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DIRECTOR,  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

ALSO PRESENT AT MEETINGS OF THE US INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
ARE THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OF THE THREE MILI-  
TARY SERVICES WHO ARE THERE AS PARTICIPATING OBSERVERS.  
THIS IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT IN THE PROCESS OF  
PRODUCING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WHEREIN  
THE OBSERVERS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATE  
AS IF THEY WERE FULL MEMBERS IN ALL ASPECTS AND AT  
ALL STAGES OF PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES.

SLIDES OFF

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THE LAST PARAGRAPH IN THE JOB DESCRIPTION IS ONE YOU WOULD FIND IN THE FINE PRINT OF A HIGHLY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT. IT IS THE PARAGRAPH WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS AN ACTIVE CONTENDER IN THE COLD WAR AND NAMES THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS THE NATION'S FOREMOST COLD WAR WARRIOR. AS SUCH HE IS THE CURATOR OF THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL COLD WAR ASSETS. IN 1948, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY, OUR GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZED FORMALLY AND OFFICIALLY THE KIND OF COVERT ACTIVITIES WHICH ALL MODERN STATES--AND SOME VERY OLD ONES--HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN FOR CENTURIES. ON THE CHART OF CIA'S ORGANIZATION, YOU SAW THAT CIA'S CLANDESTINE SERVICES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE OPERATIONS, WHICH WE CALL "COVERT ACTION." THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE READERS OF RAMPARTS MAGAZINE MAY HAVE HEARD OF SOME OF OUR ACTIVITIES LAST WINTER. THE COLD WAR ACCOUNT IS THE DIRECTOR'S MOST DELICATE TASK, AND MOST ONEROUS.

I NEED NOT SAY TO AN AUDIENCE OF THIS SORT THAT EACH ONE OF THESE FOUR REQUIREMENTS BRINGS WITH IT A HOST OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IN THE TIME THAT REMAINS I WANT TO DISCUSS A FEW OF THE MAJOR ONES AS THEY APPLY TO THE DIFFERENT HATS WORN BY THE DIRECTOR.

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FIRST LET ME SPEAK OF THE AGENCY'S OUTSIDE RELATIONSHIPS. CONSIDER THE MATTER OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS. YOU MAY KNOW THAT THE DIRECTOR REPORTS TO THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES AND THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES OF BOTH THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE. SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES OF THESE FOUR LARGE COMMITTEES CONSTITUTE OUR FORMAL CONTACT WITH THE HILL. THE DIRECTOR AND HIS PREDECESSORS HAVE DEALT WITH THESE COMMITTEES IN TERMS OF UTMOST CANDOR. THE COMMITTEES, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE ESTABLISHED AN ENVIABLE RECORD FOR SECURITY. THE RELATIONSHIP, ACCORDINGLY, HAS BEEN OF THE HAPPIEST.

IN THE COURSE OF ANY CONGRESSIONAL YEAR, THE DIRECTOR WILL APPEAR BEFORE MANY OTHER COMMITTEES OF BOTH THE HOUSE AND SENATE, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT SIMPLY TO BRIEF ON SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS OF LEGITIMATE CONCERN TO THESE GROUPS. FOR EXAMPLE, AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR HE GOES BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY TO TELL ITS MEMBERS ALL WE KNOW ABOUT NUCLEAR MATTERS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA. SCARCELY A DAY PASSES WITHOUT SOME KIND OF LESS FORMAL CONTACT WITH COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND COMMITTEE STAFFS. WE FEEL THE DIRECTOR AND OTHER AGENCY OFFICERS ASSIST THE CONGRESS IN ITS RESPONSIBILITIES BY PROVIDING CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF PRIVILEGED INFORMATION.



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AS TO CIA'S PARTICULAR COMMITTEES, I KNOW THAT HAVING A WELL-DEFINED RESPONSIBILITY TO THEM HAS HAD A SALUTORY EFFECT ON THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF OUR BUSINESS. I ALSO KNOW THAT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT HAS TIME AND TIME AGAIN BEEN OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.

WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE CONGRESSIONAL GROUPS TO WHICH WE QUITE LITERALLY REPORT WILL CONTINUE, OR WHETHER IT WILL BE CHANGED SO THAT THE DIRECTOR WILL REPORT TO WHAT THE PRESS LIKES TO CALL A "JOINT WATCH-DOG COMMITTEE," IS A MATTER ENTIRELY UP TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP ITSELF. IF CONGRESS DESIRES IT THAT WAY, SO IT WILL BE. IF THEY LIKE IT AS IT IS--AND THE HISTORICAL RECORD WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THIS IS THE CASE--IT WILL CONTINUE THIS WAY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS NO REASON FOR US IN CIA EVEN TO HAVE AN OPINION ON THE MATTER. I ASSURE YOU THAT THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND HIS ASSOCIATES ARE QUITE RELAXED ABOUT THIS ONE.

NOW ABOUT THE DCI AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC. AS WE OBSERVE OUR FELLOW AMERICANS, WE CAN PERCEIVE A VAST AMBIVALENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE PHENOMENA KNOWN AS "SECRETS OF STATE." FOR EXAMPLE, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF OUR CITIZENS KNOW ENOUGH TO REALIZE THAT OUR WAR PLANS MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED AND

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THAT OUR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM MUST NOT BE COMPROMISED. WHEN THEY PAUSE TO THINK A MINUTE, THEY ALSO GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA THAT THE COUNTRY'S PRIME SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE SUBTLE AND SOPHISTICATED METHODS WE USE IN OUR ANALYTICAL WORK ARE LIKEWISE SECRETS OF STATE AND SHOULD NOT BE DUMPED INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT THE PUBLIC SENSES ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS BUT DOES NOT KNOW, AND WHAT ITS GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TELL IT, IS NEVERTHELESS A CAUSE OF GNAWING IRRITATION. ALL KINDS OF PEOPLE CONTINUALLY THRASH AROUND EVINCING IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AN UNHAPPINESS ABOUT WHAT THEY CALL UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENT SECRECY. AFTER ALL, IT IS THEIR GOVERNMENT. WHY DOES NOT THEIR GOVERNMENT SATISFY THEIR LEGITIMATE CURIOSITY?

THIS IS PARTICULARLY THE CASE WHEN THE PUBLIC GETS THE NOTION THAT THE SECURITY WRAPS AROUND SUCH AND SUCH A CASE ARE NO LONGER JUSTIFIED. OFTEN WE DISAGREE. WE FEEL, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THERE ARE STILL LOTS OF THINGS ABOUT PENKOVSKY, WHO PROVIDED SOVIET SECRETS, AND BLAKE AND PHILBY, WHO SPIED FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THAT WE DON'T WANT TO DISCUSS OUT LOUD. SO WERE THERE, UNTIL A FEW WEEKS AGO, ABOUT THE FAMOUS FRENCH RASCAL, PACQUES, WHO DID SUCH A JOB ON NATO SECRETS FOR THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; BUT NO LONGER. AS OF THE PUBLI-

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CATION OF LEON URIS'S NEW BOOK, TOPAZ, THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO BE SAID ABOUT PACQUES. THE PUBLIC NOW KNOWS ALL ABOUT PACQUES AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS IN QUITE A FLUTTER. IN FACT THE CHIEF OF THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE FELT OBLIGED TO POSTPONE A VISIT TO THE US ENTIRELY ON THIS ACCOUNT.

THE LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE PRESS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION, REALIZING THAT ANYTHING LIKE THE PACQUES CASE WILL FIND A RAVENING AUDIENCE, FEEL FREE TO TURN AN HONEST PENNY BY PUBLISHING A GREAT MANY THINGS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT UNSAID. THE PROBLEM HERE IS A DOUBLE ONE. NOT ONLY DO THESE UTTERANCES FREQUENTLY COMPROMISE ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE ASSETS, BUT THEY ALSO AGGRAVATE THE PUBLIC APPETITE FOR MORE. THIS SITUATION IS AN EXTREMELY VEXING ONE TO COPE WITH, AND WE HAVE DECIDED THAT SILENCE IS THE ONLY PRESCRIPTION. PAINFUL THOUGH IT IS, IT IS FAR AND AWAY THE LESSER EVIL. EARLY ON WE DISCOVERED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF WE GOT INVOLVED IN A DEBATE, WE MIGHT HAVE TO STOP IT AT AN EVEN MORE EMBARRASSING POINT OR GO ON TO TALK OURSELVES VIRTUALLY INTO BANKRUPTCY.

I OFTEN THINK OF THE STORY OF THE INQUISITIVE TOURIST OF MANY YEARS BACK WHO QUERIED A ONE-ARMED INDIAN ON THE STATION PLATFORM IN ALBUQUERQUE. OVER AND AGAIN HE TRIED TO ELICIT FROM THE MAN HOW HE CAME

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TO LOSE HIS ARM. FINALLY, THE INDIAN BROKE DOWN AND GAVE THE KIND OF ANSWER I AM AFRAID WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE SOONER OR LATER IF WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO GET SUCKED INTO ONE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. LOOKING THE TOURIST SQUARELY IN THE EYE, THE INDIAN SAID, "MISTER, IT GOT BIT OFF", AND HE SAID IT WITH SUCH FINALITY THAT THE TOURIST HAD TO SETTLE FOR THAT REPLY AND NOTHING MORE. THERE IS NO DENYING THE FACT THAT THE TOURIST WAS BETTER INFORMED THAN WHEN HE BEGAN THE INTERROGATION, BUT ONE THING FOR SURE IS THAT HE WAS NO LESS CURIOUS.

NOW, LET'S TURN AGAIN TO THE SECOND PARAGRAPH IN THE JOB DESCRIPTION, THE ONE WHICH MAKES THE DCI THE GOVERNMENT'S SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. YOU ALMOST HAVE TO SIT WHERE HE AND A FEW OF HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES SIT TO APPRECIATE THE STAGGERING QUANTITY AND VARIETY OF INFORMATION REQUIRED BY A MODERN WORLD POWER SUCH AS OURS. EVEN THOUGH THE DCI IS MANDATED PRINCIPALLY TO HANDLE WHAT ARE CALLED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--AS OPPOSED TO INTELLIGENCE NECESSARY FOR PURELY DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES--THE QUANTITY AND VARIETY ARE STILL BEWILDERING IN MAGNITUDE.

OBVIOUSLY, THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS IS NOT CONCERNED WITH ART FOR ART'S SAKE. OBVIOUSLY, EVERYTHING

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WE ENDEAVOR TO COLLECT IN THE WAY OF RAW MATERIAL, THEN TO PROCESS, AND ANALYZE, AND TO FORWARD IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER IS DESIGNED TO HELP SOMEBODY MAKE UP HIS MIND ABOUT HOW SUCH AND SUCH A PIECE OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SHOULD BE FORMULATED OR IMPLEMENTED. WE ARE IN BUSINESS PURELY AND SIMPLY TO AID THE POLICY MAKER AND OPERATOR DO HIS JOB. A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT AND SKILL GOES INTO PICKING THE CORRECT INSTRUMENTALITY FOR COLLECTING THE RAW MATERIAL, AND INTO DEPLOYING THE BEST TALENT FOR ANALYSIS, PACKAGING, AND DELIVERY.

OBVIOUSLY, I COULD USE HOURS OF YOUR TIME IN TALKING ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WHAT HELP IT OFFERS THE POLICY AND ACTION PEOPLE. IF I DIDN'T WATCH MYSELF I COULD BE ACCUSED OF GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN POLICY FORMULATION WAS CENTRAL, PIVOTAL, AND OVERPOWERING. THE FACT IS THAT IN SOME INSTANCES IT HAS GREAT INFLUENCE; IN OTHERS IT MAY HAVE NO INFLUENCE AT ALL. THIS IS NOT BECAUSE OUR OFFERING IS LATE OR IRRELEVANT OR WRONG; IT IS BECAUSE SOME OF THE OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING THE DECISION ARE FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ONES WHICH LIE WITHIN OUR PURELY INFORMATIONAL JURISDICTION.

IN THESE TERMS THERE WILL BE OCCASIONS WHEN NO MATTER HOW TRUTHFULLY AND ELOQUENTLY WE DESCRIBE THE KEY

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ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION TO WHICH THE POLICY IS POINTED, OUR FINDINGS AND THEIR POSSIBLE POLICY IMPLICATIONS WILL BE SNOWED UNDER IN THE STORM OF THE NON-INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS. IN THESE CASES THE TIMELINESS AND RELEVANCE OF OUR PRODUCT GOES FOR NAUGHT. THERE IS FOR US, HOWEVER, ONE GREAT POTENTIAL SOURCE OF SATISFACTION. WHETHER WE GET IT OR NOT DEPENDS UPON THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR OFFERING. IF IT IS READ, BELIEVED, AND THEN DISREGARDED THIS IS MOST OF WHAT WE CAN ASK. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE CAN BE CONTENT IN HAVING DONE THE BEST WE COULD; WE MIGHT EVEN HARBOR SOME IGNOBLE PLEASURES AT REALIZING THE PAIN OF OUR CONSUMER WHEN HE REALIZES THAT HE WAS TURNING HIS BACK ON SOME VERY SOUND AND USEFUL INFORMATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE ARE READ, DISBELIEVED, AND DISREGARDED, WE MIGHT JUST AS WELL HAVE STOOD IN BED.

THUS I MIGHT SAY THAT WE IN INTELLIGENCE OUGHT TO PUT A LOT HIGHER PREMIUM ON BEING BELIEVED, THAN IN HOPING TO EXERT INFLUENCE. SO I NOW WANT TO TALK BRIEFLY ABOUT THE MATTER OF CREDIBILITY -- NOT SO MUCH HOW YOU GAIN IT -- WHICH IS EASY TO EXPLAIN AND EXTREMELY HARD TO ACHIEVE -- BUT HOW YOU CAN LOSE IT, WHICH IS BOTH EASY TO EXPLAIN AND VERY EASY TO ACCOMPLISH.

YOU CAN LOSE YOUR CREDIBILITY BY A SLOPPY PRODUCT: BY A PAPER WHOSE OPENING PARAGRAPH PROCLAIMS AN INNOCENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND WHOSE TEXT IS DISFIGURED BY OBVIOUS OMISSIONS AND ERRORS. IN THIS CASE YOU LOSE IT BY A SIMPLE DISPLAY OF POOR WORKMANSHIP. IN TIME YOU CAN RETRIEVE THIS KIND OF LOSS BY IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY OF YOUR WORK.

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THE WAY, HOWEVER, THAT YOU CAN LOSE YOUR CREDIBILITY AND PERHAPS LOSE IT IRRETRIEVABLY IS BY ALLOWING YOURSELF TO CONFUSE YOUR FUNCTION WITH THAT OF THE POLICY MAKER. AS SOON AS YOUR INTELLIGENCE UTTERANCES BEGIN TO APPEAR AS POLICY DECLARATIONS YOUR CREDIBILITY IS COOKED. FURTHERMORE, THE MATTER GOES DEEPER. IF AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN A SWING POSITION PERMITS HIMSELF TO BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER OF A HOT POLICY DISPUTE BY NOTHING MORE THAN PARTICIPATING IN A CONVERSATION OR DEBATE, OR BY GIVING VOICE IN SOME FORUM, NO MATTER WHAT HE MAY ISSUE SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE WAY OF AN INTELLIGENCE PRONOUNCEMENT WILL BE BOUND TO BE SUSPECT BY A SIGNIFICANT PART OF HIS AUDIENCE. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY VIRTUE OF HIS DUTIES AS THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRST INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, FINDS HIMSELF PRESENT AT ALL SORTS OF HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS WHERE POLICY ISSUES ARE BEING DEBATED. HIS PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES FIND THEMSELVES PRESENT AT COMPARABLE GATHERINGS ON LOWER LEVELS. IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT ALL OF US IN CIA ENDEAVOR TO REMAIN UNINVOLVED, LEST OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBATE WEAKEN OR DESTROY THE IMPACT OF THE INTELLIGENCE INPUT WE ARE TRYING TO MAKE, OR PLANNING TO MAKE IN THE FUTURE.

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AS I INDICATED A MOMENT AGO, WE MUST, OF COURSE, BE RELEVANT AS WELL AS CREDIBLE AND OUR STRIVING FOR RELEVANCE SHOULD BE, AND IS, OF VERY HIGH IMPORTANCE. IT IS NOT TOO HARD TO ARRANGE THINGS SO THAT THE GENERAL THRUST OF OUR INTELLIGENCE WORK IS RELEVANT TO THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COUNTRY'S NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS. AFTER ALL, WE DO READ THE NEWSPAPERS. FURTHERMORE, WE READ A PRODIGIOUS AMOUNT OF INFORMATION GATHERED FROM OUR OWN SOURCES WHICH DOES NOT HIT THE PRESS OR EVEN REACH NON-INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT UNLESS WE DISSEMINATE IT. THUS, WE KNOW PERHAPS BETTER THAN ANYONE WHAT SHOULD BE THE FOCI OF ATTENTION OF, SAY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

BUT THIS KIND OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ANYWHERE NEAR ENOUGH. WE MUST KNOW EXACTLY WHAT PHASE OF THE CHINA PROBLEM OR THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM IS ON THE POLICY GRIDDLE RIGHT NOW FOR ACTION TO BE TAKEN NEXT WEEK OR NEXT MONTH. TO ACHIEVE A FEELING FOR THE CHARACTER OF THIS KIND OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT, INTELLIGENCE MUST BE PLUGGED INTO THE POLICY ECHELONS AT ALMOST EVERY LEVEL.

I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THIS IS THE CASE. THE CONTACT WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF, AND



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THE NSC, AFFORD HIM ESSENTIAL HIGH LEVEL GUIDANCE. HE IS, OF COURSE, ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETINGS OF THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP PRESIDED OVER BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE. LOWER ECHELON OFFICERS OF THE AGENCY SIT AS REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUPS AND THE MANY LESS FORMAL INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES AND AD HOC WORKING GROUPS WHICH ARE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ISSUES.

SO IT IS WITH ALL THE MEMBERS ON THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD WHO ARE KEYED INTO IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS AT THE LEVEL OF DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. THEY ALSO WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN MANY OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. WITH ALL OF THESE CONTACTS AMONG THE MAKERS AND IMPLEMENTERS OF POLICY WE ARE ABLE TO GIVE A HIGHLY DESIRABLE PRECISION TO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND TO TAILOR OUR PRODUCTS NEATLY TO THE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE WOULD-BE USER.

I HAVE TRIED TO MAKE THIS PROBLEM SOUND PLAUSIBLE, RATIONAL, AND EASY BECAUSE SO FAR IN MY REMARKS IT IS JUST THAT. I COULD STOP TALKING OF THE MATTER HERE IF I WERE TALKING MERELY OF THE CIA AND NOT OF THE ENORMOUS INSTITUTION COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IT IS NOT ONLY THAT WE IN CIA

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MUST STRIVE FOR RELEVANCE, IT IS RATHER THAT THE SEVERAL LARGE COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY SHOULD REACT AS ONE, AND THAT THEIR SPECIAL ASSETS AND SKILLS COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITH AS LITTLE DUPLICATION AS CAN BE CONTRIVED. THIS TAKES ME TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD ITEM IN THE DIRECTOR'S JOB DESCRIPTION, THE ONE THAT SAYS THE DCI SHOULD COORDINATE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORT.

HERE THERE IS NO SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE BUSINESS WHICH I CAN PLUCK OUT AND EXAMINE. THERE IS ONLY ONE PROBLEM AND THAT IS THE MASSIVE ONE OF COORDINATION ITSELF.

THE FACT THAT THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 RECOGNIZED THE NECESSITY FOR A DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS MADE AN APPROACH TO THE TASK POSSIBLE. WHENEVER THE DCI GETS TO FEELING SORRY FOR HIMSELF HE NEED ONLY REFLECT ON THE BUREAUCRATIC CONFUSION WHICH SURROUNDS INTELLIGENCE WORK IN PRACTICALLY EVERY FRIENDLY FOREIGN STATE SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A DCI. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ONE REASON AT LEAST FOR ITS BEING SO IS THAT THERE IS NO OFFICER WITH DUTIES AND POWERS REMOTELY RESEMBLING THOSE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

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WHAT I AM GETTING AT IS THAT THE MANDATE OF THE DCI, INCLUDING HIS EX OFFICIO CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND HIS RECOURSE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, IS THE THING WHICH MAKES THE PRESENT HIGH LEVEL OF COORDINATION POSSIBLE. IN THE ACQUITTAL OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS COORDINATOR, HE HAS THE SERVICES OF A SMALL AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL STAFF. THIS STAFF IS REPRESENTED ON THE CIA CHART BY THE SMALL BOX MARKED, "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM EVALUATION." THIS STAFF, WITH APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY, EVALUATES THE FOUR LARGE PROGRAMS WHICH ENCOMPASS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF THE COMMUNITY'S INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. FOR THE MORE DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS, THE DCI ALSO RELIES ON THE MEMBERS OF USIB AND A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE SUBSTRUCTURE OF USIB SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES. THESE ARE OFTEN, THOUGH NOT INVARIABLY, CHAIRED BY A SENIOR OFFICER OF THE CIA AND ARE MANNED BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM USIB AGENCIES. ALL CHAIRMEN REPORT TO THE DCI AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USIB. THERE IS ONE OF THESE COMMITTEES, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH FOCUSES ITS ATTENTION UPON ALL FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR ENERGY; ANOTHER ON GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS; ANOTHER ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE, AND ITS PRODUCTS.

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THE USIB COMMITTEES WITH A SUBSTANTIVE FOCUS FOR THEIR WORK ARE NATURALLY IMMERSSED IN THAT SUBJECT MATTER. AS A MATTER OF COURSE THEY STAND READY TO ISSUE COORDINATED COMMUNITY VIEWS ON THE MANY IMPONDERABLES WHICH SURROUND, SAY, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE BUSINESS. THEY DO MUCH MORE. THEY ARE, FOR EXAMPLE, PERENIALLY IDENTIFYING THE CRITICAL GAPS IN OUR COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS AND THAT. THESE COMMITTEES THINK UP WAYS OF REMEDYING THE SITUATION, AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR AND USIB AS TO WHAT ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MECHANISMS SHOULD BE SPRUCED UP, WHAT NEW ONES INITIATED, WHAT COMPONENT OR COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY SHOULD MAKE THE ADDITIONAL EFFORT, HOW MUCH IT WILL COST, AND SO ON. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY WRESTLE WITH CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF MAKING THE COMMUNITY NOT MERELY EFFECTIVE, BUT COST-EFFECTIVE.

OF COURSE, THE SIMPLE EXISTENCE OF MACHINERY IS NOT ENOUGH TO DO THE TRICK. THERE HAVE BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE, DISAGREEMENTS OF A FAIRLY HIGH ORDER. IT IS, HOWEVER, REMARKABLE HOW FEW OF THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE REQUIRED THE INTERVENTION OF HIGHER AUTHORITY. THAT THINGS WORK AS SMOOTHLY AS THEY DO IS LARGELY A RESULT, IN MY OPINION, OF A HIGH ORDER OF PROFESSIONALISM ON THE PART OF THE SENIOR OFFICIALS

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IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. APART FROM PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF A HIGH ORDER, THE PRESENT MEMBERS OF USIB HAVE ALL HAD MANY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN INTELLIGENCE WORK. AT USIB WE ARE THEREFORE ABLE TO DISCUSS AND SOLVE PROBLEMS FROM A COMMON BACKGROUND OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE.

THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THE JOB DESCRIPTION, YOU WILL RECALL, HAD TO DO WITH THE DCI'S ACTIVITIES IN THE MATTER OF THE COLD WAR. SINCE 1948 THIS PARTICULAR DUTY HAS BEEN THE DIRECTOR'S MOST DIFFICULT AND DEMANDING ONE. WHAT UNDERLIES IT IS THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE VAST UNDERCOVER BARE KNUCKLES STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION, ITS ADHERENTS, AND ASSORTED COMMUNIST PARTIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE REST OF US WHO BELIEVE IN THE CLASSICAL BELIEFS OF THE WESTERN TRADITION, ON THE OTHER.

ALL FOREIGN POLICY ON OUR SIDE BEGINS WITH THE RESOLVE TO DEFEND THESE BELIEFS. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THEY DO IMPOSE CERTAIN VERY EMBARRASSING RESTRAINTS UPON THE KIND OF ACTIVITIES WE MAY UNDERTAKE IN OUR CONFRONTATION WITH THE DARK FORCES OF COMMUNISM. THE LATTER HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR COLD WAR AIMS AND LITTLE SECRET OF THEIR STRATEGY. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, WRAPPED THE MATTER OF THEIR TACTICS AND THEIR WEAPONRY IN A CLOAK OF SECRECY. THEY USUALLY TRY TO

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PRETEND THAT THE OUTRAGEOUS THINGS WHICH THEY HAVE PLANNED AND DO TO THE HURT OF OUR SIDE ARE NOTHING MORE THAN EVIL-MINDED ACCUSATIONS BY OURSELVES.

THEREFORE, IN CONTENDING WITH THEM, WE HAVE HAD TO BE SIMILARLY DISCREET AND SIMILARLY UNACKNOWLEDGED; OUR ACTIVITIES HAVE HAD TO HAVE ATTRIBUTES WHICH MADE THEM PLAUSIBLY DENIABLE BY OUR GOVERNMENT. OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS A VAST DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NOT HAVING HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH A CERTAIN ACT AND MERELY ISSUING A PLAUSIBLE DENIAL THEREOF. THE POINT IS THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ANYBODY'S HAND WILL SHOW SOMETIMES AND OURS HAS IN A FEW CASES. WHEN THIS HAPPENS AT LEAST ONE OF OUR BELIEFS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. SOME OF OUR CITIZENS EXPRESS HORRIFIED SURPRISE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT COULD PLAY AT THE COLD WAR BUSINESS AND NOT BE TRUTHFUL WHEN CAUGHT AT IT. THEY FIND IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CONDONE THE ONE OR THE OTHER. IN COMMENTING ON THIS MATTER THE OTHER DAY, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID TO A CIA AUDIENCE: "YOU CAN'T EXPECT IN A FREE SOCIETY TO BE IMMUNE FROM CRITICISM. BUT REMEMBER IF YOU WEREN'T BEING CRITICIZED, YOU WOULDN'T BE DOING ANYTHING. WHAT YOU'RE DOING IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE...THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FEEL BETTER BECAUSE THERE IS A CIA."

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IN GENERAL TERMS THE VICE PRESIDENT SPOKE CORRECTLY, BUT I AM SURE HIS REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WAS USED IN THE COLLECTIVE SENSE AND NOT MEANT TO APPLY TO EVERY SINGLE AMERICAN. FOR TO OUR CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE, AND TO YOURS I WILL WARRANT, THERE ARE LOTS OF INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS WHO DO NOT FEEL BETTER BECAUSE THERE IS A CIA. IN FACT, NO ONE HAS EVER FELT WORSE THAN SOME OF THESE PEOPLE AND THEY MAKE NO SECRET WHATEVER ABOUT THEIR MALAISE. REAMS OF COPY, INDEED MORE THAN A BOOK OR TWO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN EITHER BY THESE PEOPLE OR BY JOURNALISTS, PAMPHLETEERS, AND THE LIKE FOR THEIR DELECTATION. THE BURDEN OF THE MORE FLAMBOYANT INDICTMENTS GOES SOMETHING LIKE THIS: "CIA AND THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COVERT ACTION APPARATUS GETS ITSELF TO THE POINT OF RUNNING ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY, ENGAGING IN UNAUTHORIZED MEDDLING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AND EVEN OF MAKING MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS CARRYING WITH THEM HIGH RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR. THEY DO THIS NOT MERELY HIDDEN FROM PUBLIC COGNIZANCE, BUT WITHOUT BOTHERING TO CHECK OUT THEIR NEFARIOUS ANTICS WITH THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF GOVERNMENT." THE CRITICS THEN GO ON TO DOCUMENT THE CASE WITH A LONG MISH MASH OF FACT AND FANCY-- WITH EMPHASIS ON THE LATTER--WHICH MAKES VERY GOOD READING.

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I DO NOT NEED TO STRESS BEFORE THIS AUDIENCE THE UTTER NONSENSE OF SUCH ALLEGATIONS. I AM SURE THAT YOU AND I COULD JOIN IN A HEARTY LAUGH WERE IT NOT THAT SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AIMED PRIMARILY AT DISCREDITING THESE EFFORTS OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE MINDS OF OUR PEOPLE--AND TO A CERTAIN LIMITED EXTENT DO SUCCEED. MORE IMPORTANT BY FAR IS THE GRIST WHICH THEY FURNISH THE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MILLS WHICH NOW, INSTEAD OF HAVING TO MAKE THEIR STORIES UP OUT OF WHOLE CLOTH, CAN POINT TO NON-COMMUNIST AMERICANS AS THE SOURCE FOR THEIR STORIES.

WHAT IS IMPORTANT FOR AN AUDIENCE OF THIS SORT TO UNDERSTAND IS THAT EVERY PIECE OF COVERT ACTION WHICH IS UNDERTAKEN IS DONE SO WITH THE APPROVAL OF AN INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE VERY CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL, AND THAT A GREAT MANY OF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE IN FACT INITIATED BY THIS GROUP AND LAID UPON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

WHENEVER OUR SLIP SHOWS WHEN IT SHOULD NOT, OR WHENEVER SOME ENTERPRISING FELLOW CITIZEN REACHES BENEATH OUR SKIRT TO PULL IT INTO VIEW, THERE ARISE ONCE AGAIN NOT MERELY THE FAMILIAR INDICTMENTS BUT SOME PRETTY BALD SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE. THE REMEDIES WHICH OUR CRITICS HAVE IN MIND RUN FROM

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VERY SIMPLE ONES SUCH AS, "KNOCK OFF THE WHOLE BUSINESS; IT IS UN-AMERICAN," TO VERY COMPLICATED ONES WHICH INVOLVE SUCH THINGS AS SEPARATING THE COVERT ACTION JOB FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND SEPARATING THE DCI FROM COVERT ACTION. THE SIMPLE ONES ARE EASILY DISPOSED OF. NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP HAS PAID THEM MUCH HEED, AND AS LONG AS THIS IS THE CASE NOTHING WILL HAPPEN. THE MORE COMPLICATED SUGGESTIONS HAVE, OF COURSE, SET US TO THINKING.

WHAT OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE FEASIBLE AND REASONABLE? SUPPOSE IT WAS DECIDED TO SEPARATE COVERT ACTION FROM THE AGENCY AND TO DROP PARAGRAPH FOUR FROM THE DIRECTOR'S JOB DESCRIPTION. WHERE WOULD YOU PUT THE NEW COVERT ACTION ORGANIZATION? IMAGINE HOW THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD REACT TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY BECOME THE COLLECTIVE PATRON OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. I DO NOT THINK THEY WOULD WELCOME THE SUGGESTION WITH ENTHUSIASM. HOW ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE? SUPERFICIALLY THIS MIGHT BE THE ANSWER. YET IF YOU WILL REALIZE THAT COVERT ACTION BEGINS WHERE MR. RUSK LEAVES OFF, AND THAT COVERT ACTION LEAVES OFF WHERE MR. McNAMARA AND GENERAL WHEELER BEGIN, YOU WILL SPEEDILY UNDERSTAND THAT

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PUTTING THESE ACTIVITIES UNDER OUR MILITARY DEPARTMENT WOULD BE TO PUT THEM IN EXACTLY THE WRONG KIND OF ENVIRONMENT. PEOPLE BROUGHT UP IN THE MILITARY TRADITION, THOUGH UNDENIABLY MORE HOSPITABLE TO THIS SORT OF ACTIVITY THAN OUR FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS AND DIPLOMATS, WOULD NEVERTHELESS HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY OPERATING THE WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTALITIES THAT CONSTITUTE THE ARSENAL OF THIS PARTICULAR FIGHTING MACHINE. IF THEY YIELDED TO THEIR NATURAL PREFERENCES AND EMPHASIZED THE PARAMILITARY SIDE, THEY WOULD BE MISSING THE WHOLE POINT.

OF COURSE, YOU NEED NOT PUT IT UNDER ANY DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT. SET IT UP BY ITSELF WITH ITS OWN DIRECTOR. IF A SEPARATION HAD TO BE MADE, THIS ONE COMES CLOSEST TO MAKING SENSE. HOWEVER, THE TROUBLE IS THAT ALL COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY INTELLIGENCE, THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE. AT ONCE WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE NECESSITY OF MOVING ALL CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OUT OF THE GENERAL AREA OF INTELLIGENCE AND PUTTING THEM AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE COVERT ACTIVITIES.

WHATEVER THE VARIOUS DUTIES THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAS, I CANNOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THAT BY

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FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK IS THE PRODUCTION OF SOUND AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS WHY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS CREATED AND INDEED, IS VERY LARGELY THE REASON WHY WE ARE IN BUSINESS TODAY. I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT I KNOW THAT THE INTELLIGENCE WE ARE PRODUCING IS BEING READ BY THE POLICY MAKERS AND THIS IS ALL THAT WE CAN ASK. THE VALUE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS TO POLICY DECISIONS IS, BROADLY SPEAKING, CERTAINLY NOT A QUESTION I COULD ATTEMPT TO ANSWER. ONLY THE POLICY MAKER CAN GIVE THE ANSWER. BUT, THERE ARE TWO ASSURANCES WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE MUST HAVE: FIRST, THAT CIA IS RESPONSIVE WITH THE TRUTH AS WE PERCEIVE IT; AND SECONDLY, THAT OUR AUDIENCE IS AWARE OF OUR WORK AND STUDIES IT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT TODAY THE DIRECTOR DOES HAVE ASSURANCES RESPECTING BOTH.

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